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FOOLS' CRUSADE: Yugoslavia, NATO, and Western Delusions by Diana Johnstone
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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GROWTH by Paul A. Baran
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|Questioning the Syrian "Casualty List"
by Sharmine Narwani
"Perception is 100 percent of politics," the old adage goes. Say something three, five, seven times, and you start to believe it in the same way you "know" aspirin is good for the heart.
Sometimes, though, perception is a dangerous thing. In the dirty game of politics, it is the perception -- not the facts -- of an issue that invariably wins the day.
In the case of the raging conflict over Syria, the one fundamental issue that motors the entire international debate on the crisis is the death toll and its corollary: the Syrian casualty list.
The "list" has become widely recognized -- if not specifically, then certainly when the numbers are bandied about: 4,000, 5,000, 6,000 -- sometimes more. These are not mere numbers; they represent dead Syrians.
But this is where the dangers of perception begin. There are many competing Syrian casualty lists with different counts -- how does one, for instance gauge if X is an accurate number of deaths? How have the deaths been verified? Who verifies them and do they have a vested interest? Are the dead all civilians? Are they pro-regime or anti-regime civilians? Do these lists include the approximately 2,000 dead Syrian security forces? Do they include members of armed groups? How does the list-aggregator tell the difference between a civilian and a plain-clothes militia member?
Even the logistics baffle. How do they make accurate counts across Syria every single day? A member of the Lebanese fact-finding team investigating the 15 May 2011 shooting deaths of Palestinian protesters by Israelis at the Lebanese border told me that it took them three weeks to discover there were only six fatalities, and not the 11 counted on the day of the incident. And in that case, the entire confrontation lasted a mere few hours.
How then does one count 20, 40, or 200 casualties in a few hours while conflict continues to rage around them?
My first port of call in trying to answer these questions about the casualty list was the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), which seemed likely to be the most reliable source of information on the Syrian death toll -- until it stopped keeping track last month.
The UN began its effort to provide a Syrian casualty count in September 2011, based primarily on lists provided by five different sources. Three of their sources were named: The Violations Documenting Center (VDC), the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), and the Syrian Shuhada website. At that time, the lists varied in number from around 2,400 to 3,800 victims.
The non-UN casualty list most frequently quoted in the general media is the one from the Syrian Observatory -- or SOHR.
Last month, SOHR made some headlines of its own when news of a rift over political viewpoints and body counts erupted. Two competing SOHRs claimed authenticity, but the group headed by Rami Abdul Rahman is the one recognized by Amnesty International.
OHCHR spokesman Rupert Colville stated during a phone interview that the UN evaluates its sources to check "whether they are reliable," but appeared to create distance from SOHR later -- during the group's public spat -- by saying: "The (UN) colleague most involved with the lists . . . had no direct contact with the Syrian Observatory, though we did look at their numbers. This was not a group we had any prior knowledge of, and it was not based in the region, so we were somewhat wary of it."
Colville explains that the UN sought at all times "to make cautious estimates" and that "we have reasonable confidence that the rounded figures are not far off."
While "also getting evidence from victims and defectors -- some who corroborated specific names," the UN, says Colville, "is not in a position to cross-check names and will never be in a position to do that."
I spoke to him again after the UN decided to halt its casualty count in late January. "It was never easy to verify, but it was a little bit clearer before. The composition of the conflict has changed. It's become much more complex, fragmented," Colville says. "While we have no doubt there are civilian and military casualties . . . we can't really quantify it."
"The lists are clear -- the question is whether we can fully endorse their accuracy," he explains, citing the "higher numbers" as an obstacle to verification.
The Casualty Lists Up Close: Some Stories Behind the Numbers
Because the UN has stopped its casualty count, reporters have started reverting back to their original Syrian death toll sources. The SOHR is still the most prominent among them.
Abdul Rahman's SOHR does not make its list available to the general public, but in early February I found a link to a list on the other SOHR website and decided to take a look. The database lists the victim's name, age, gender, city, province, and date of death -- when available. In December 2011, for instance, the list names around 77 registered casualties with no identifying information provided. In total, there are around 260 unknowns on the list.
Around that time, I had come across my first list of Syrians killed in the crisis, reportedly compiled in coordination with the SOHR, that contained the names of Palestinian refugees killed by Israeli fire on the Golan Heights on 15 May 2011 and 5 June 2011 when protesters congregated on Syria's armistice line with Israel. So my first check was to see if that kind of glaring error appears in the SOHR list I investigate in this piece.
To my amazement, the entire list of victims from those two days were included in the SOHR casualty count -- four from May 15 (#5160 to #5163) and 25 victims of Israeli fire from June 5 (#4629 to #4653). The list even identifies the deaths as taking place in Quneitra, which is in the Golan Heights.
It also didn't take long to find the names of well-publicized pro-regime Syrians on the SOHR list and match them with YouTube footage of their funerals. The reason behind searching for funeral links is that pro-regime and anti-regime funerals differ quite starkly in the slogans they chant and the posters/signs/flags on display. Below is a list of eight of these individuals, including their number, name, date and place of death on the casualty list -- followed by our video link and further details if available:
Besides featuring on the SOHR list, Lt. Col. Yasar Qashur, Iyad Harfoush, Mohammad Abdo Khadour, and General Abdo al Tallawi and his two sons and nephew also appear on two of the other casualty lists -- the VDC and Syrian Shuhada -- both used by the United Nations to compile their numbers.
Nir Rosen, an American journalist who spent several months insides Syria's hot spots in 2011, with notable access to armed opposition groups, reported in a recent Al Jazeera interview:
The report issued in January by Arab League Monitors after their month-long observer mission in Syria -- widely ignored by the international media -- also witnessed acts of violence by armed opposition groups against both civilians and security forces.
The Report states: "In Homs, Idlib and Hama, the observer mission witnessed acts of violence being committed against government forces and civilians. . . Examples of those acts include the bombing of a civilian bus, killing eight persons and injuring others, including women and children. . . In another incident in Homs, a police bus was blown up, killing two police officers." The observers also point out that "some of the armed groups were using flares and armour-piercing projectiles."
Importantly, the report further confirms obfuscation of casualty information when it states: "the media exaggerated the nature of the incidents and the number of persons killed in incidents and protests in certain towns."
On February 3, the eve of the UN Security Council vote on Syria, news broke out that a massacre was taking place in Homs, with the general media assuming that it was true and that all violence was being committed by the Syrian government. The SOHR's Rami Abdul Rahman was widely quoted in the media as claiming the death toll to be at 217. The Local Coordination Committees (LCCs), which provide information to the VDC, called it at "more than 200," and the Syrian National Council (SNC), a self-styled government in absentia of mainly expats, claimed 260 victims.
The next day, the casualty count had been revised down to 55 by the LCCs.
Even if the count is at 55, that is still a large number of victims by any measure. But were these deaths caused by the Syrian government, by opposition gunmen, or in the crossfire between the two groups? That is still the question that needs to break through the deafening narratives, lists, and body counts.
In International Law, Detail Counts
While the overwhelming perception of Syrian casualties thus far has been that they are primarily unarmed civilians deliberately targeted by government forces, it has become obvious these casualties are also likely to include: civilians caught in the crossfire between government forces and opposition gunmen; victims of deliberate violence by armed groups; "dead opposition fighters" whose attires do not distinguish them from regular civilians; and members of the Syrian security forces, both on and off duty.
Even if we could verify the names and numbers on a Syrian casualty list, we still don't know their stories, which, if revealed, may pose an entirely different picture of what is going on in Syria today.
These questions are vitally important to understand the burden of responsibility in this conflict. International law provides for different measures of conflict: the two most frequently used gauges for this are the Principle of Necessity, i.e., using force only when it is necessary, and the Principle of Proportionality, i.e., the use of force proportional to the threat posed.
In the case of Syria -- like in Bahrain, Yemen, Egypt, and Libya -- it is widely believed that the government used unnecessary force in the first instance. Syrian President Bashar Assad, like many of these Arab rulers, has as much as admitted to "mistakes" in the first months of protests. These mistakes include some shooting deaths and detaining a much larger number of protesters than expected, some of whom were allegedly tortured.
Let us assume, without question, that the Syrian government was overzealous in its use of force initially, and therefore violated the Principle of Necessity. I tend to believe this version because it has been so stated by the Arab League's observer mission -- the first and only boots-on-the-ground monitors investigating the crisis from within the country.
However -- and this is where the casualty lists come in -- there is not yet nearly enough evidence, not by any measure acceptable at a court of law, that the Syrian government has violated the Principle of Proportionality. Claims that the regime has used disproportionate force in dealing with the crisis are, today, difficult to ascertain, in large part because opponents have been using weapons against security forces and pro-regime civilians almost since the onset of protests.
Assuming that the number of casualties provided by the UN's OHCHR is around the 5,000-mark, the last official figure provided by the group. The question is whether this is a highly disproportionate number of deaths when contrasted directly with the approximately 2,000 soldiers of the regular Syrian army and other security forces who have been reportedly killed since April 2011.
When you calculate the deaths of the government forces in the past 11 months, they amount to about six a day. Contrast that with frequent death toll totals of around 15+ each day disseminated by activists -- many of whom are potentially neither civilian casualties nor victims of targeted violence -- and there is close to enough parity to suggest a conflict where the acts of violence may be somewhat equal on both sides.
Last Sunday, as Syrians went to the polls to vote on a constitutional referendum, Reuters reports -- quoting the SOHR -- that 9 civilians and 4 soldiers were killed in Homs, and that elsewhere in Syria there were 8 civilian and 10 security forces casualties. That is 17 civilians and 14 regime forces -- where are the opposition gunmen in that number? Were none killed? Or are they embedded in the "civilian" count?
Defectors or Regular Soldiers?
There have also been allegations that many, if not most, of the soldiers killed in clashes or attacks have been defectors shot by other members of the regular army. There is very little evidence to support this as anything more than a limited phenomenon. Logically, it would be near impossible for the Syrian army to stay intact if it were turning on its rank-and-file soldiers in this manner -- and the armed forces have remained remarkably cohesive given the length and intensity of the conflict in Syria.
In addition, the name, rank, and city of each of the dead soldiers are widely publicized by state-owned media each day, often accompanied by televised funerals. It would be fairly simple for the organized opposition to single out by name the defectors they include on their casualty lists, which has not happened.
The very first incident of casualties from the Syrian regular army that I could verify dates to was 10 April 2011, when gunmen shot up a bus of soldiers travelling through Banyas, in Tartous. This incident took place a mere few weeks after the first peaceful protests broke out in Syria, and so traces violence against government forces back to the start of political upheaval in the country.
"Witnesses" quoted by the BBC, Al Jazeera, and the Guardian insisted that the nine dead soldiers were "defectors" who had been shot by the Syrian army for refusing orders to shoot at demonstrators.
Joshua Landis, director of the Center for Middle East Studies at the University of Oklahoma, debunked that version on his Syria Comment website. Another surviving soldier on the bus -- a relation of Lt. Col. Yasar Qashur, #6022 on the SOHR list, whose funeral I link to above -- denied that they were defectors too. But the narrative that dead soldiers are mostly defectors shot by their own troops has stuck throughout this conflict -- though less so, as evidence of gunmen targeting Syrian forces and pro-regime civilians becomes belatedly apparent.
The VDC -- another of the UN's OHCHR sources for casualty counts -- alleges that 6,399 civilians and 1,680 army defectors were killed in Syria during the period from 15 March 2011 to 15 February 2012. All security forces killed in Syria during the past 11 months were "defectors?" Not a single soldier, policeman, or intelligence official was killed in Syria except those forces who opposed the regime? This is the kind of mindless narrative of this conflict that continues unchecked. Worse yet, this exact VDC statistic is included in the latest UN report on Syria issued last week.
Humanitarian Crisis or Just Plain Violence?
While few doubt the Syrian government's violent suppression of this revolt, it is increasingly clear that, in addition to the issue of disproportionally, there is the question of whether there is a "humanitarian crisis" as suggested by some western and Arab leaders since last year. I sought some answers during a trip to Damascus in early January 2012 where I spoke to a select few NGOs that enjoyed rare access to all parts of the country.
Given that words like "massacre" and "slaughter" and "humanitarian crisis" are being used in reference to Syria, I asked International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Spokesman Saleh Dabbakeh at the time how many calls for urgent medical assistance his organization had received in 2011. His response was shocking. "Only one that I recall," said Dabbakeh. Where was that, I asked? "Quneitra National Hospital in the Golan," he replied, "last June." This was when Israeli troops fired on Syrian and Palestinian protesters marching to the 1973 armistice line with the Jewish state. Those same protesters that ended up on SOHR's casualty list.
A Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) worker confirmed that, recalling that his organization treated hundreds of casualties from the highly-publicized incident.
As the level of violence has escalated, however, the situation has deteriorated, and the ICRC now has received more calls for medical assistance -- mainly from private hospitals in Homs. The SARC today has nine different points in Homs where it provides such assistance. The only two places they do not currently serve are the neighborhoods of Baba Amr and Inshaat "because the security situation does not allow for it -- for their own safety, there is fighting there."
During a phone call last Thursday, one NGO officer explained that the measure for a "humanitarian crisis" is in level of access to basic staples, services, and medical care. He told me off the record: "There is a humanitarian crisis in (i.e.) Baba Amro today, but not in Syria. If the fighting finishes tomorrow, there will be enough food and medical supplies."
"Syria has enough food to feed itself for a long time. The medical sector still functions very well. There isn't enough pressure on the medical sector to create a crisis," he elaborated. "A humanitarian crisis is when a large number of a given population does not have access to medical aid, food, water, electricity, etc. -- when the system cannot any longer respond to the needs of the population."
But an international human rights worker also cautions: "The killing is happening on both sides -- the other side is no better."
People have to stop this knee-jerk, opportunistic, hysterical obsession with numbers of dead Syrians, and ask instead: "who are these people and who killed them?" That is the very least these victims deserve. Anything less would render their tragic deaths utterly meaningless. Lack of transparency along the supply-chain of information and its dissemination -- on both sides -- is tantamount to making the Syrian story all about perception, and not facts. It is a hollow achievement and people will die in ever greater numbers.
Sharmine Narwani is a political analyst covering the Middle East. You can follow her on twitter @snarwani. This article was first published in Al-Akhbar English on 28 February 2012 under a Creative Commons license.